“Aravot” says that for domestic political reasons Armenia’s leadership is hardly interested in heavily publicizing its claims that unlike Ilham Aliyev, Serzh Sarkisian was ready to sign an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh at the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in Kazan. “On the one hand, there is a temptation to say in the international arena, ‘We are good, flexible and ready for mutual concessions.’ On the other hand, in terms of domestic consumption, it is awkward to say that and risk escalating [opposition] accusations of sellout,” editorializes the paper.
“Yerkir” claims that neither the conflicting parties, nor the mediators know what will happen after the Kazan summit. The paper says the Armenian government should now not only show the international community that the summit collapsed because of Aliyev but also “rectify mistakes committed in the past.” But it questions the government’s ability to draw political “dividends” from this situation.
“Haykakan Zhamanak” says Azerbaijan always toughens its position during important negotiations. “In these conditions, why would Azerbaijan be interested in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?” writes the paper. “Baku will seriously think about a settlement when the process of Armenia’s decline stops and our country starts getting on its feet in both military-political and moral-psychological senses.”
“Serzh Sarkisian understands very well that he became president thanks to the March 1 [2008 post-election violence,]” writes “Chorrord Inknishkhanutyun.” “That is, he became president thanks to Robert Kocharian, rather than the people, through the use of security levers, the underworld and the system of vote falsifications. If he likes that status and if he thinks that there is no need for pre-term elections, that’s his choice. But the [opposition Armenian National] Congress (HAK) is obliged to try to use all possibilities of regime change without upheavals and peace negotiations in the first instance. Of course, many would call it an unnecessary waste of time in the sense that negotiations would most probably fail. But such a failure would also be a result.”
“The fact that the HAK is now in deadlock is natural,” says “Hayots Ashkhar.” “It turns that the ‘criminal regime’ does not collapse as a consequence of socioeconomic problems and developments around Artsakh and that it has to be brought down in a single-minded fashion. But how?” The pro-presidential paper says that the HAK is not keen to spark a popular uprising or adopt other “revolutionary methods” because it lacks domestic and external support.
(Tigran Avetisian)
“Yerkir” claims that neither the conflicting parties, nor the mediators know what will happen after the Kazan summit. The paper says the Armenian government should now not only show the international community that the summit collapsed because of Aliyev but also “rectify mistakes committed in the past.” But it questions the government’s ability to draw political “dividends” from this situation.
“Haykakan Zhamanak” says Azerbaijan always toughens its position during important negotiations. “In these conditions, why would Azerbaijan be interested in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?” writes the paper. “Baku will seriously think about a settlement when the process of Armenia’s decline stops and our country starts getting on its feet in both military-political and moral-psychological senses.”
“Serzh Sarkisian understands very well that he became president thanks to the March 1 [2008 post-election violence,]” writes “Chorrord Inknishkhanutyun.” “That is, he became president thanks to Robert Kocharian, rather than the people, through the use of security levers, the underworld and the system of vote falsifications. If he likes that status and if he thinks that there is no need for pre-term elections, that’s his choice. But the [opposition Armenian National] Congress (HAK) is obliged to try to use all possibilities of regime change without upheavals and peace negotiations in the first instance. Of course, many would call it an unnecessary waste of time in the sense that negotiations would most probably fail. But such a failure would also be a result.”
“The fact that the HAK is now in deadlock is natural,” says “Hayots Ashkhar.” “It turns that the ‘criminal regime’ does not collapse as a consequence of socioeconomic problems and developments around Artsakh and that it has to be brought down in a single-minded fashion. But how?” The pro-presidential paper says that the HAK is not keen to spark a popular uprising or adopt other “revolutionary methods” because it lacks domestic and external support.
(Tigran Avetisian)