“Chorrord Ishkhanutyun” suggests the Armenian authorities and the opposition are alike in at least one matter as the share the same position on the Karabakh settlement.
“It is possible to conventionally single out two wings both inside the governing coalition and the Armenian National Congress – those advocating a compromise and hardliners. Everything is clear in the case with the opposition. Here it is Karabakh war veterans who strongly object to any territorial concessions being made to Azerbaijan. That is, those who immediately participated in the liberation of the territories. And the situation with the hardliners on the government side, to put it mildly, looks odd. Here hardliners are divided into two groups -- [ex-president] Robert Kocharian and [ex-foreign minister] Vartan Oskanian and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun). Kocharian and Oskanian have no moral right to shout ‘not an inch of land to be ceded’ and not because they did not participate in the liberation of these territories, but because beginning from 1998, for ten years on, both were ‘ceding’ those territories at every step of their way,” the paper writes.
“Aravot’s” editor writes: “I do not possess sociological research data, but I have the impression that advocates of a real compromise-based solution to the Karabakh conflict make a small minority in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Public opinion in Armenia tends to be the following: ‘Yes, let’s establish peace without withdrawing from anywhere and let Azerbaijan recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence’. Correspondingly, the mentality of our neighbors is as follows: ‘Yes, let’s establish peace, but Armenians must withdraw from everywhere and Nagorno-Karabakh must become part of Azerbaijan. The only political figure who had the courage to speak about the need for implementing real and not fabulous maximalist programs was [Armenia’s first President] Levon Ter-Petrosian. And it was in 1997, not today. We all know how it ended.”
“Hayots Ashkhar” publishes an interview with political analyst Alexander Iskandarian.
“Let’s assume there is no financial crisis, the world has turned around and suddenly a political decision has been made to resolve the conflict. Who and how should make [Karabakh leader] Bako Sahakian or [Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev] comply with this decision? What are the technologies? Where should the peacekeeping force be deployed? In what way? They’re talking about the Lachin corridor. Have the authors of these analyses been to Lachin? Do they imagine what it is to deploy a peacekeeping force in the Lachin corridor? If they haven’t been there, they at least could have looked at the map to make sure that it is impossible to make up a greater foolishness,” Iskandarian tells the paper.
“Haykakan Zhamanak” presents the details that it says it knows about President Serzh Sarkisian’s recent trip to Karabakh: “According to well-informed sources, Serzh Sarkisian told dissatisfied generals that if they want to keep their possessions, they should keep low profile. And since the generals have quite a lot to lose, they agreed to keep silent. The same generals who never missed an occasion to say ‘no inch of land to the enemy’, in fact found their minibus services, timber and other businesses to be an interest superior to Karabakh.”
“Hraparak” publishes an analytical piece by political scientist Manvel Sarkisian also touching upon Sarkisian’s visit: “The visit, nevertheless, revealed the most secret aspects of the situation. First of all, many things became clear when the talk focused not on the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but on the territories surrounding it and peacekeepers. No matter how hard the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group tried to create an illusion that Nagorno-Karabakh with its people and president are in the center of the negotiations, they could not hide their genuine interests – Karabakh-Armenian troops must withdraw from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and international peacekeeping forces must become their real masters. That’s all that concerns the international community. And Nagorno-Karabakh’s status will be either discussed or not. That’s the problem of the presidents of the conflicting parties. And here’s the moment for the Armenian society and the leadership of Armenia to think. Many start saying they are not afraid of war. But they don’t say whether they are afraid of the peacekeepers?”
(Aghasi Yenokian)
“It is possible to conventionally single out two wings both inside the governing coalition and the Armenian National Congress – those advocating a compromise and hardliners. Everything is clear in the case with the opposition. Here it is Karabakh war veterans who strongly object to any territorial concessions being made to Azerbaijan. That is, those who immediately participated in the liberation of the territories. And the situation with the hardliners on the government side, to put it mildly, looks odd. Here hardliners are divided into two groups -- [ex-president] Robert Kocharian and [ex-foreign minister] Vartan Oskanian and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun). Kocharian and Oskanian have no moral right to shout ‘not an inch of land to be ceded’ and not because they did not participate in the liberation of these territories, but because beginning from 1998, for ten years on, both were ‘ceding’ those territories at every step of their way,” the paper writes.
“Aravot’s” editor writes: “I do not possess sociological research data, but I have the impression that advocates of a real compromise-based solution to the Karabakh conflict make a small minority in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Public opinion in Armenia tends to be the following: ‘Yes, let’s establish peace without withdrawing from anywhere and let Azerbaijan recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence’. Correspondingly, the mentality of our neighbors is as follows: ‘Yes, let’s establish peace, but Armenians must withdraw from everywhere and Nagorno-Karabakh must become part of Azerbaijan. The only political figure who had the courage to speak about the need for implementing real and not fabulous maximalist programs was [Armenia’s first President] Levon Ter-Petrosian. And it was in 1997, not today. We all know how it ended.”
“Hayots Ashkhar” publishes an interview with political analyst Alexander Iskandarian.
“Let’s assume there is no financial crisis, the world has turned around and suddenly a political decision has been made to resolve the conflict. Who and how should make [Karabakh leader] Bako Sahakian or [Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev] comply with this decision? What are the technologies? Where should the peacekeeping force be deployed? In what way? They’re talking about the Lachin corridor. Have the authors of these analyses been to Lachin? Do they imagine what it is to deploy a peacekeeping force in the Lachin corridor? If they haven’t been there, they at least could have looked at the map to make sure that it is impossible to make up a greater foolishness,” Iskandarian tells the paper.
“Haykakan Zhamanak” presents the details that it says it knows about President Serzh Sarkisian’s recent trip to Karabakh: “According to well-informed sources, Serzh Sarkisian told dissatisfied generals that if they want to keep their possessions, they should keep low profile. And since the generals have quite a lot to lose, they agreed to keep silent. The same generals who never missed an occasion to say ‘no inch of land to the enemy’, in fact found their minibus services, timber and other businesses to be an interest superior to Karabakh.”
“Hraparak” publishes an analytical piece by political scientist Manvel Sarkisian also touching upon Sarkisian’s visit: “The visit, nevertheless, revealed the most secret aspects of the situation. First of all, many things became clear when the talk focused not on the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but on the territories surrounding it and peacekeepers. No matter how hard the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group tried to create an illusion that Nagorno-Karabakh with its people and president are in the center of the negotiations, they could not hide their genuine interests – Karabakh-Armenian troops must withdraw from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and international peacekeeping forces must become their real masters. That’s all that concerns the international community. And Nagorno-Karabakh’s status will be either discussed or not. That’s the problem of the presidents of the conflicting parties. And here’s the moment for the Armenian society and the leadership of Armenia to think. Many start saying they are not afraid of war. But they don’t say whether they are afraid of the peacekeepers?”
(Aghasi Yenokian)